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Abstract
This paper argues that the existence of knowledge-intensive firms
pose puzzelments for the contractual theories of the firm. For
example, in knowledge-intensive firms physical assets are
widely absent, the nature of employment relations and asset-
ownership are much less clear compared to industrial firms.
Although knowledge-intensive firms account for a growing share
in wealth-creation and employment, they have hitherto made
relatively little impact on contributions to the contractual theories
of the firm (e.g. the work associated with Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1971 1975, 1985; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Meckling and Jensen,
1976, Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart, 1995). Here, I identify
puzzlement for the contractual theories of the firm related to the
existence of knowledge-intensive firms.
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 Introduction
Following Coase (1937), the contractual approaches to the firm begin their take-
off period at the beginning of the 1970s - a time where knowledge-intensive
business was less important and the industrial firm (Chandler, 1962) dominated
public and scholars’ interest. Interestingly, Chandler (1962) has described the
industrial enterprise as a large, capital-intensive, and diversified business firm engaged
in the handling of physical goods in some or all of the successive industrial processes
from the procurement of raw material to the sale to the ultimate customer. It is
this type of company that has attracted the attention of many of the contributors
to the contractual theories of the firm1.
Here in contrast, I am interested in knowledge-intensive firms - firm which are
usually small compared to industrial firms. Production involves ideas, concepts,
and knowledge rather than physical goods, and products exhibit a low degree of
standardization. These firms are also capital intensive, but their capital is of an
intellectual rather than a financial nature. Unlike in industrial firms, the main
asset of these companies is knowledge of highly skilled people carried literally in
the employees’ heads. Knowledge is brought to production through personal
relations. Both knowledge and personal relations are intangible assets and resist
direct control, fiat, and monitoring. Given that principality is linked to asset
ownership (Grossmann and Hart, 1986), it is less clear who is the agent and who
is the principal in knowledge intensive firms, since in knowledge-intensive firms
associated professionals (main input) are usually less dependent on the firm than
the firm is dependent on them (Akerberg, 1993). Furthermore, what is the
meaning of ownership of intangible assets like knowledge, personal relations
and reputation in contrast to physical assets in industrial firms? Which
governance form efficiently organizes the main asset in knowledge intensive
                                         
1 It is worth noting that Oliver Williamson’s (1975) Markets and Hierarchies carries the subtitel
Analysis and Antitrust Implications, which hints on his concern with large industrial
companies to the justification of which he has clearly contributed.
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business? Here I suggest that to the extent that contractual theories of the firm
build their explanatory apparatus on ownership of physical assets (Hart, 1995),
specialization in monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), fiat, and direction
(Williamson, 1975) in traditional employment relations (Coase, 1937),
knowledge-intensive service firms pose puzzlement for contractual theories of
the firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, I clarify the notion of
knowledge-intensive firm and outline differences to the industrial firm.
Secondly, I discuss the pillars on which all contractual theories of the firm build
their propositions. Thirdly, I elaborate on puzzlements posed by knowledge-
intensive business for the contractual theories of the firm.  Finally, I conclude
with implications for further research.
Knowledge-Intensive-Firms
Chandler’s (1990) seminal work has extensively described the rise of the modern
capitalist enterprise, the paradigm case of which he takes to be the large,
diversified, capital intensive manufacturing firm. His Scale and Scope: The
Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (1990) covers the period starting from the 1870s
through the 1960s and makes some reference to more recent development until
the 1980s. Yet, since then economies have seen the rise of knowledge-intensive
companies (e.g. management consultants, technology consultants, law firms,
marketing and PR services, advertising agencies) which play an increasingly
important role in employment and wealth generation (Aharoni, 1993).
In advanced forms of capitalism, for example in Japan, the US, and Europe
we observe a shift towards work in the realm of information, knowledge, and
ideas (Drucker, 1992: 95; Barley, 1994). For example, Barley (1994) estimated
the share of physical labor to shrink by half from 1990 to the turn of the year
2000, while he predicts knowledge work (e.g. professional service,
management-consultancy, etc.) to grow strongly during the same time.
Relatedly, statistics (OECD, 1995) indicate that the sector business servives
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has grown steadily and account for nearly as much employment as the
manufacturing sector.
While knowledge-intensive companies seem to be of growing importance for
growth creation and employment, their fundamental differences to industrial
manufacturing firms has until now not made significant impact on the
contractual theories of the firm. Knowledge-intensive firms differ from industrial
manufacturing firms in at least the following aspects.
· Input characteristics. Unlike industrial manufacturing firms knowledge
intensive firms are less dependent on financial capital, land, technology, and
physical labor. They are rather dependent on the professional expertise of
knowledge-workers associated with the firm, as well as their constant
attraction (Starbuck, 1992; Akerberg, 1993). It should be noted that a part of
their knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 1958).
· Employment relation. Association of knowledge-workers with the firm are
often different from traditional employment relationships in industrial
manufacturing firms (Akerberg, 1993). Partnerships, freelance work, and
temporary employment are common features. The dependency of
knowledge-workers on employers seems to be the reverse of the relation
between industrial manufacturing firm and manual workers (Drucker, 1992).
While manual workers need access to the firm’s physical production facilities
more than the firm needs them,. knowledge-intensive firms seem to depend
more on the knowledge-workers than knowledge workers depends on them.
· Ownership. As knowledge workers cannot be owned by the firm, and
physical assets (machinery, office space) are of less importance in knowledge-
intensive business, physical asset ownership may have only limited impact on
the propensity to invest and as a basis for power relations within the firm.
Although reputation is important to knowledge intensive firm, reputation
may (1) equally depend on the individual knowledge workers, and (2)
reputation may be best signified as rented from clients and employees rather
than owned the firm.
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· Production and Output characteristics. In contrast to industrial
manufacturing firms, where production is capital intensive and involves
repeated processing of physical goods which make routines and
standardization of processes possible, production in knowledge intensive
firms relies on intangibles (Shotack, 1984), whereby the production involves
low standardization (Maister, 1993), highly interactive product definition and
customization (Lovelock, 1983), as well as a high degree of non-routine
problem definition and solving (Alvesson, 1995). Furthermore, the
coordination mechanisms employed are contingent on the type of production
(Thompson, 1967). If production is standardized like in industrial
manufacturing firms and signified by sequential interdependence,
coordination might be most economically achieved through planning. If by
contrast production is signified by reciprocal interdependence, coordination
in knowledge-intensive firms might require mutual adjustment.
These characteristics suggest that:
· When assignments are idiosyncratic and non-standardized, monitoring
knowledge-workers’ performance and work conduct becomes difficult if not
impossible during production because establishing monitoring criteria ex
ante seem hardly possible.
· Because professionals by definition are experts in fulfilling their tasks,
professional work resists direct control. For the same reason, providing
direction enforced by fiat seems neither necessary nor feasible - not least
because nobody in the organization knows better how to perform the task at
hand than the knowledge-workers themselves.
· While there is only self ownership of human assets, and association between
knowledge workers and knowledge-intensive firms takes often forms that
differ from the traditional employment contract, potential exclusion from
physical production facilities are unlikely to yield ex post bargaining power
to the owners of physical assets. Thus, the threat of exclusion from physical
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assets for bargaining purposes seems less effective compared to industrial
manufacturing firms.
These features of knowledge-intensive companies pose puzzlement for the
contractual theories of the firm to the extent that they build their explanations of
the firm’s existence on concepts such as (1) ownership of physical assets (Hart,
1995), (2) specialization in monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), (3) fiat as
governance mechanism (Williamson, 1975) and (4) traditional employment
relations (Coase, 1937).
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Contractual Theories of the Firm
By contractual approaches to the firm I mean the work associated with the
contributions to Transaction Cost Theory (e.g. Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975, 1985;
Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978), Property Rights/Team-production Approach
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972); Agency Theory (Meckling and Jensen,1976); and
finally the Incomplete Contract Approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990, Hart, 1995). 2
What unifies these approaches, different in focus they may be, is that they all see
the firm as efficient contractual entity (Foss, 1996). For example, Alchian and
Demsetz (1972: 794) argue: “The essence of the classical firm is identified here as
a contractual structure with: (1) joint input production; (2) several input owners;
(3) one party is common to all the contracts of the joint input owners; (5) who
holds the residual claim; and (6) who has the right to sell his central contractual
residual status.” Likewise, but independently of team-production Meckling and
Jensen (1976) see the firm as ‘nexus of contracts’, whereby contractual relations
are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers,
customers, creditors, etc. (p. 215). More specifically, Williamsom (1975, 1985)
linked governance forms (markets, hybrids, hierarchy) to different forms of
contract law (classical, neoclassical, relational). Finally, Hart (1995), explicitly
builds on the notion of incomplete contract and the allocation of property rights.
Besides the focus on contracts, contractual theories of the firm share two
additional features: opportunism and imperfect information. It is the latter which
provides the raison d’être for the contractual theories of the firm. If there were
                                         
2 These approaches have focused on at least one of the classical questions of a theory of the
firm (Holmström and Tirole, 1989), namely (1) the existence of the firm (e.g. Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975, 1985, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), (2) the boundaries of the firm ( e.g.
Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Hart, 1995), and (3) the internal organization ( e.g.
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Here I am intersted in
explanations of the existence of knowledge-intensive firms.
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perfect information opportunism were plainly irrelevant, while if there were no
opportunism imperfect information would still matter as impediment to
efficiency. It is thus not surprising that all contractual theories of the firm have
addressed imperfect information which renders contractual exchange costly and
invites opportunism. Both, in turn make the alignment of incentives necessary.
Imperfect Information and Inefficiency
In contrast to neoclassical economics where perfect information is assumed, the
contractual theories’ struggle is with real world problems where information is
imperfect and sometimes asymmetric, where prices may not capture all
dimensions of a given good, and where the future is uncertain. If perfect
information were real, competition free from artificial restriction, prices were
sufficient statistics, and contractual market clearing costless, Pareto-optimal
allocation could be achieved through markets. That is, given an equilibrium
exists, no one could be made better off without making someone else worse off
(Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1959). Put differently: Pareto-efficiency is the ideal
benchmark with which to compare other economic outcomes. When this
benchmark is maintained, every market outcome that deviates from this standard
is inefficient.
As ideals are unreal and contractual theories of the firm make claims to reality,
they assume less than perfect information. Through this they distinguish
themselves from the unreal assumptions of the neoclassical theory, but
nevertheless remain truthful to either or both its method (methodological
individualism, marginal analysis) and the overall efficiency benchmark (Pareto
optimality). If information is imperfect, a deviation from this benchmark follows,
and thus by definition all market outcomes reached under imperfect information
regimes are inefficient. Put differently: they are market failures. Market failure
due to imperfect information is also the raison d’ étre for the contractual theories of
the firm.
It is worth distinguishing between reasons for imperfect information and its
implication. The former might be due to ‘bounded rationality’, which means that
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the decisions makers cognitive capacity is limited so that not all relevant
information for contractual exchange can be processed. That is, it is the cognitive
capacity, rather than rationality per se which is bounded (Langlois, 1990).
Another reason is unobservable information, that is information might be not
accessible to a person or a group because it is hidden by another group or person
(asymmetric information). Alternatively, information might be simply worthless
detached from its context, or its value may be underdermined (i.e. tacit
knowledge). A final reason for imperfect information is subjective perception that
leads to different information related to the same observed phenomena. While
there are many reasons leading to imperfect information, its implications are
information costs and potential market failure.
Introducing imperfect information in economic models gives insight into why
market fail (e.g. transaction costs, imperfect contracting) and possible non-market
corrections (e.g. in firms) occur. Markets fail among other reasons because
contracts that could make one or both parties better of do not come into existence
or come into existence but lead to inefficient outcomes. Contracts may not come
into existence because prices are absent for a given class of goods (Arrow, 1972).
Additionally, prices may be insufficient statistics for market clearing to happen
(Akerlof, 1972). Asymmetric information may constitute an at least temporary
monopoly of unobservable information which prevents efficient contracting to be
completed. That is, one of the partners to a contract is in possession of
unobservable information before a contractual agreement (adverse selection) or
during its complementation (moral hazard) while the other is not (Ibid.). While
there are several implications of imperfect information, there are also several
non-market cures suggested in the contractual theories of the firm.
Intrafirm Remedies
The proposition of the contractual theories of the firm is to alleviate contractual
problems related to imperfect information through a combination of (1)
specialization in efficiency enhancing intrafirm activities, and (2) property rights
allocation which provide (3) incentives to enhance efficiency.
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Furthermore, it is important to consider which cost category a theory considers,
for enhancing efficiency means in the context of the contractual theories of the
firm cost reduction and the prevention of productivity losses. The following table
illustrates different contractual theories of the firm sorted by specialization,
property rights, relevant costs and contract type, and the theories’ focus on the
classical questions of the theory of the firm.
Put table 1 about  here
Before the discussion of these theories in relation to knowledge-intensive
business and associated puzzlements can proceed some clarifications of the
following questions are in order. (1) Which role does specialization on
efficiency enhancing activities play in different contractual theories of the
firm? (2) What categories of information costs can be distinguished? (3) What
is the role of property rights in contractual theories of the firm?
(1) Specialization. The firm in transaction cost economics and team production /
agency theory can be clustered as two responses to market failure3 due to
imperfect information. Each employs different forms of specialization on
efficiency enhancing intrafirm activities. While the former suggest fiat and
direction as activities targeting at qualitative intrafirm coordination when market
                                         
3 Oliver Hart has summarized and formalized much of the insights of other contributions to
the contractual theory of the firm..
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contracting is prohibitively costly or impossible (e.g. Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1975, 1985), the latter focuses on monitoring and the provision of incentives as
efficiency enhancing activities in the face of asymmetric information (e.g. Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Meckling and Jensen, 1976).
(2) Information costs are efficiency losses incurred due to the implications of
imperfect information (Dallmann, 1979: 148). If related to contracts in the theory
of the firm, information costs are efficiency losses that occur while preparing,
writing and executing contracts. It is worth noting that contractual theories of the
firm have specified these losses, i.e. monitoring-, bonding-, search-, negotiation-,
or management costs by focusing on certain efficiency enhancing activities.
Transaction costs - a subcategory of information costs4 - are by far the most
widely considered information costs mentioned in the literature of the
contractual theory of the firm. A transaction can be defined as the exchange of
property rights (Commons, 1931), and with Dahlmann (1979: 147-148) we can
distinguish accordingly transaction costs as follows:
“In order for an exchange between two parties to be set up it is necessary
that the two search each other out, which is costly in terms of time and
resources. If the search is successful and the parties make contact they
must inform each other of the exchange opportunity that may be present,
and the conveying of such information will again require resources. If
there are several economic agents on either side of the potential bargain to
be struck, some costs of decision making will be incurred before the terms
of trade can be decided on. Often such agreeable terms can only be
determined after costly bargaining between the parties involved. After the
trade has been decided on, there will be the costs of policing and
monitoring the other party to see that his obligations are carried out as
                                         
4 Notice that while transaction costs capture most of the relevant information costs used in the
contractual theory of the firm, transaction costs are not identical to information costs. While
transaction costs require per definition the exchange of property rights, information costs do
not.
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determined by the terms of the contract, and of enforcing the agreement
reached.”
This description suggests that one can distinguish ex ante and ex post
information costs , that is before or after concluding a contract. Different theories
of the firm have focused on either or both. For example, Coase (1937) has focused
on ex ante information costs when he asserts that firms exist because the usage of
the market system is costly, while Williamson (1975, 1985) adds to this story that
the anticipation of ex post transaction costs is brought to bear on the decision to
invest in transaction specific assets. Others are concerned with ex-post
information costs (e.g. monitoring) that can be avoided through ex-ante
alignment of diverging interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or efficient allocation
of residual income rights in team production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Likewise, Hart (1995) deals with ex post information costs that can be avoided if
property rights are allocated in a manner that prevents postcontractual hazards.
(3) Property rights. Specialization in, for example, monitoring or fiat in
conjunction with the allocation of property rights provides the incentive structure
that governs behavior in organization. Ownership is the most widely accepted
property right and it is useful to distinguish different rights associated with
ownership. According to Furubotn & Pejovitch (1972) it is possible to distinguish
ownership into the (1) the right to use the asset (ius usus), (2) the right to
appropriate the returns from this asset (ius usus fructus), (3) the right to change
its form and substance (ius abusus), and (4) the right to transfer each of the three
previous mentioned rights to another party (ius successionis). While Hart (1995)
considers all rights as a basis of power relation in contractual exchange, Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) are mainly concerned with the first 2 rights when they argue
that the allocation of the residual income rights (ius usus fructus) to a monitor as
residual claimant prevents productivity losses in team production. Finally, Coase
can be interpreted to be concerned with situations where transaction costs
prevent the usage of property rights or occur due to their misspecification.
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Property rights matter in the contractual theory of the firm because their
allocation and specification influences individual behavior. If a property right is
not assigned to an individual, then all costs and rewards associated with its use
do not accrue to him or her personally. By implication the direct link between
individual behavior and its consequences will be diluted. Thus, if for example
income rights (ius usus fructus) are assigned to a group rather than to one
person, and if individual behavior is not easy observable, then the inclination to
hold back efforts may be the rational response which decreases income attainable
were property rights clearly assigned (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The
assignment of property rights is especially salient when contracts are incomplete
(Hart, 1995). In a world of incomplete contracts and information costs not all
property rights can be specifically assigned. Thus, residual right concern
contractual unspecified issues, the responsibility of which needs to be assigned if
efficiency losses are to be prevented. Furthermore, not only the specification and
assignment of property rights matters, but the ability to enforce property rights
too is of crucial importance (Furbotn and Pejovich, 1972). The usage of property
rights in turn depends on information costs, which if prohibitively high prevent
exchange or alternatively, the toleration of post contractual harmful behavior
(p.1139).
Puzzlements: The existence of knowledge-intensive firms
This section discusses contractual theories of the firm in relation to knowledge-
intensive business. It concerns mainly the question if the contractual theories of
the firm can explain the firm’s existence in this business. To the extent that the
pillars (property rights, specialization on fiat and monitoring, employment
contracts) of the contractual theories of the firm seems week on footing when
applied to knowledge intensive firms, puzzlements occur that constitute a
within-paradigm critique.
Transaction Cost Theory
The existence of the firm is a natural starting point in the contractual theories
of the firm. Coase’s (1937) was arguably  the first who introduced questions
Knowledge intensive firms as puzzlement for the contractual theories of the firm
13
of why firms exist and the firm´’s nature into economic analysis with hitherto
left “obscure the role of business management and the employer-employee
relation” (Coase in Winter and Williamson, 1993: 38)5. The firm’s existence is
explained by noticing that the use of market coordination via price is often
costly due to ex-ante transaction costs (e.g. search and bargaining), which in
Coase’s (1937: 390) rendering are simply the “costs of using the price
mechanism.”
If price coordination is costly and coordination of input owners can be
achieved by hierarchical control, that is by “supersession of the price
mechanism” (Coase in Winter and Williamson, 1993: 56), coordination will be
organized so as to economize on transaction costs. Put differently: firms exist
when hierarchical coordination is less costly at the margin compared to
market coordination.
Interestingly, in Coase’s story “the employer-employee contract has been
made the archetype of the firm” (ibid., 64), whereby one contract is
substituted for many service contracts and employees agree enforced by
hierarchy and fiat “to obey [within limits] the directions of an entrepreneur”
(p. 56). Specifying the mechanism of hierarchy and fiat, Coase (1993: 56)
quotes Butt on the Law of Master and Servant:
”It is the right of control or inference, of being entitled to tell the servant
when to work (within the hours of service) and when not to work, and
what work to do and how to do it (within the terms of this service) which
is the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the servant
from an independent contractor”
Puzzlements for Coase’s story arise, where coordination in knowledge-
intensive firms cannot rely on fiat based on traditional employment relation.
To the extent that knowledge-work concerns the identification of unknown
                                         
5 To be sure, his thrust was not to substitute but to supplement neoclassic economic analysis
which has been preoccupied with the functioning of markets and price theory.
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problems, unknown solutions, and untried means-end relations (Reich, 1991:
182), rights to control or inference, of being entitled to tell a knowledge
worker what work to do and, especially how to do it are most likely to be
rather empty. While in industrial manufacturing firms, physical work can be
specified by process and content, in knowledge-intensive firms this is hardly
the case. If thus the basis of fiat which makes coordination in hierarchies
efficient compared to market exchange is undermined, transaction cost
explanations of why firms exist are weak on footing. This is true, however,
only to the extent that comparative advantages of hierarchical coordination
supported by fiat firmly rest on traditional employment contracts.
Williamson (1975, 1985) like Coase explains the existence of firms in terms of
comparative cost advantages. Likewise, hierarchy and fiat make firm
organization a suitable alternative to market coordination. Unlike Coase,
Williamson (1985) considers in addition to ex-ante transaction costs, also costs
that emerge from postcontractual hazards. Anticipating ex-post contractual
hazards is especially salient in situations where transaction are signified by
‘asset specificity’. That is, in situations where transaction specific investments
loose significant value in others than agreed upon uses.
Investments in specific assets need safeguarding if opportunism aimed at the
ex-post appropriation of income streams which are generated by the
underlying specialized assets is feasible. In principle, safeguarding against
contractual hazards could be achieved by comprehensive contracting. To the
extent, however, that contractors are ‘boundedly rational’ (Simon, 1952, 1984)
and foresight is limited, contracts are likely to be incomplete. Even if
contracts were complete, in situations where transactions are accompanied by
investment in specialized assets, post-contractual enforcement may be
prevented by prohibitively high transaction costs. In sum, hierarchy might be
the cheaper solution.
Williamson (1985) explicitly mentions human asset specificity which occurs
when at least one partner in a transaction invests in learning that if used for
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the contractual purpose yields higher value compared to any other
transaction. Implications for the knowledge-worker-firm relation can be
easily imagined. For example a consultant may learn features of a firm’s
specific information system and ways of conducting consultant work, he may
learn about clients and their problems that are firmly bound to the
consultancy and unlikely to switch established relations.
To forestall opportunism by the firm, the consultant might only choose to
engage in this learning, when the firm offers compensations of marginal
efforts plus a compensation for increase in the consultant’s market value that
he could have obtained would he have directed his attention and time to
more general, and more widely applicable knowledge domains. While this
story is perfectly consistent with Williamsons notion of human asset
specificity, it cannot explain why a firm should exist for organizing
consultancy work.
A firm would only have comparative advantages relative to market
contracting if the total value of the specific transaction it offers would yield
not only the compensation required by the consultant, but also create more
value compared to all other possible specific learning / transaction
combinations available to the consultant. Furthermore, why should value
generated beyond the consultant’s opportunity costs accrue to the firm. Put
differently: What efficiency enhancing specialization does Williamson offer to
make this a likely case?
Here like Coase, Williamson (1991) suggests the coordination advantages of
fiat, the underlying rationale of which besides employment contracts he sees
in private ordering. He argues that:
“One explanation is that fiat has its origins in the employment contract.
Although there is a good deal to be said for that explanation, I propose a
separate and complementary explanation: The implicit contract law of
internal organization is that of forbearance. Thus, whereas courts
routinely grant standing to firms should there be disputes over prices, the
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damages to be ascribed to delays, failures of quality, and the like, courts
will refuse to hear disputes between one internal division and another over
identical technical issues. Access to the courts being denied, the parties
must resolve their differences internally. Accordingly, hierarchy is its own
court of ultimate appeal.” (Williamson, 1991: 274)
More precisely, the logic of forbearance is what sets in Williamsons account
hierarchical coordination apart from market contracting:
“The underlying rationale for forbearance law is twofold: (1) parties to an
internal dispute have deep knowledge both about the circumstances
surrounding a dispute as well as the efficiency properties of alternative
solutions -- that can be communicated to the court only at great cost, and
(2) permitting internal disputes to be appealed to the court would
undermine the efficacy and integrity of hierarchy. If fiat were merely
advisory, in that internal disputes over net recipes could be pursued in the
courts, the firm would be little more than an 'inside contracting' system.”
(Williamson, 1991: 276)
Thus fiat, as Williamson maintains, rests on private ordering advantages that
occur when deep knowledge cannot cheaply be communicated to a court.
While this argument claims that hierarchies may have advantages in the
internal dissolution of conflict, it does not satisfactorily explain why
communication costs that arise through knowledge gaps between conflicting
parties and an external judge can be lowered by substituting external
ordering with internal ordering. Furthermore, in Williamson’s account the
question why knowledge-intensive firms should exist in the first place, i.e.
why knowledge workers should enter in employment contracts instead of
relying on market contracting is not so clear either. Instead, internal and
external contracting might be not so different as far as fiat and power is
concerned in the organization of knowledge work.
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Team Production
This is exactly what Alchian and Demsetz (1972) propose when they deny
that from a contractual point of view the firm is any different from markets
with regard to power between contractual parties. Contrary to the transaction
cost view, firms “are not characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by
authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the
conventional market” (p. 777). Further they argue that making fiat the
efficiency enhancing specialization in firms is misleading. As the authors
clearly note:
“This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of
fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest
degree from ordinary market contracting ... To speak of managing,
directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive way of
noting that the employer continually is involved in ren gotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties. Telling an
employee to type this letter rather than to file that document is like my
telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of
bread. I have no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and
neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual
obligations to continue their relationship. Long-term contracts between
employer and employee are not the essence of the organization we call a
firm.” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777)
The firm’s rationale in the authors rendering then becomes a special
contractual arrangement, which through the efficient allocation of residual
property rights and specialization on monitoring solves productivity
problems in the presence of team-production.
When production involves technological indivisibities, gauging marginal
productivity of team members is difficult (metering problem). To the extent
that individual contributions cannot be gauged, team-members have an
incentive to shirk, i.e. to withhold contributions. If they do so, team
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productivity shrinks. To alleviate the metering problem while maintaining
the productivity advantages of team production, Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
suggest that team-members appoint by contract a monitor who specializes on
monitoring team production.
Team productivity will increase through monitoring to the extent that other
team members can be induced to withhold less contributions. If further
productivity gains more than off set the costs of the monitoring, efficiency
gains accrue to the team members. Cheung (1983) illustrates this point:
“My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in china before the
communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the
shore towing a good sized boat. The unique interest of the example is that
the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them”
(Cheung, 1983: 8).
But what prevents the monitor from shirking? After he is appointed as a
monitor he simply could withhold his monitoring efforts while receiving the
agreed upon compensation. To circumvent this problem, Alchian and
Demsetz (1972) suggest to make the monitor the residual claimant. Residual
rights involve (1) residual income from team production, (2) the right to alter
team membership, and (3) the right to transfer his residual rights. If the
monitor is made the residual claimant, team production takes place under an
optimal level of monitoring.
Puzzlement’s for the Demsetz and Alchian story arise if (1) process
monitoring is unlikely to be effective, or (2) monitoring can be achieved
effectively without the reallocation of residual rights. This may be the case
when unlike the Chinese boat pullers, knowledge workers engage in non-
standardized, non-repetitive work, which makes monitoring criteria hard to
establish ex ante. In such a setting no one, but the professional itself can
challenge his judgement during work conduct due to its superior local
knowledge of time and place.
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To be sure, monitoring is possible in knowledge-intensive companies, such as
small consultancies. But it takes forms that deviate from the picture of the
monitor in Alchian and Demsetz story. Process monitoring can be achieved
through peer control and group pressure in consultancy project without
making a team member the residual claimant. In peer control, it is not so
much the threat of punishment by an external monitor as it is the self-
interested maintenance of induvidual reputation among a group of peers that
drives contributions to team production. By contrast, process monitoring by
externally appointed team members seems rather impossible, if local
knowledge needed to make process control effective is missing.
Output monitoring and associated rewards and punishment may lie more in
career opportunities such as project appointment (or non appointment)
through other team members and partners. Alternatively after a certain time
period has expired non requested team members might be sorted out just like
a grocer is sorted out by clients if there is no demand for the fruits he offers.
Furthermore, senior consultants and partners might be seen as the generators
of tasks to be sold to their knowledge workers rather than as monitors with
residual claimant status. Their role might be better described as traders of
tasks to be bought by knowledge workers, whereby it is up to the trader to
whom to sell the task at the highest price. Thus in total, Alchian and Demsetz’
story that the firm is like a market with regard to power might be validated.
Puzzlements occur in relation to monitoring, the monitor and its residual
claimant status. This however, is less than trivial for their story - not least
because both concepts are Demsetz and Alchian’s main rational for the firm.
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Incomplete Contract Approach
While transaction costs theory and team production approaches to the firm build
on fiat and monitoring respectively to explain the existence of the firm, the
incomplete contract literature bemoans that both miss a sound foundations of the
power relation they assume to establish their propositions. Thus, Oliver Hart and
his co - authors (Grossmann and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, Hart, 1989,
1995) advance the argument by identifying the firm with the physical assets it
possesses whereby “ownership confers residual rights of control over the firm’s
assets” (Hart and Moore, 1990: 1120). Further, they argue that control over non-
human assets leads to control over human assets.
Through this argument they are able to explain the power relation that makes not
only fiat a credible option, but additionally sets intrafirm contracting apart from
market contracting. Furthermore, to define the firm by the physical assets it owns
allows them to define the boundaries of the firm in a clear and unambiguous
manner. But why does ownership or more precisely residual control rights of
physical assets matter?
Here, the incomplete contract literature suggests that when contracts between
agents are incomplete (e.g. they cannot account for all possible future
contingencies) and contracting is costly (e.g. transaction cost), residual control
rights which accompany the ownership of physical assets correct disincentive to
invest. Thus, asset ownership combined with the anticipation of ex post surplus
to be generated by asset use, places strong incentives to put assets to its highest
value use. In the Hart’s words:
“In a world of transaction costs and incomplete contracts, ex post residual
rights of control will be important because, through their influence on
asset usage, they will affect ex post bargaining power and the division of
ex post surplus in a relationship “ (Hart, 1995:12).
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Put differently: the question who owns a piece of private property (1) decides on
the question who chooses contractually unspecified uses, (2) decides how ex post
surplus is divided, (3) owns a credible threat to exclude others from the asset use,
and (4) thus establishes a power relations that can provide the basis of fiat.
Thus, an implication of the incomplete contract literature is that it matters who
owns a piece of property. Briefly stated: residual rights should be allocated to the
party which is potentially best equipped to increase the asset’s usage-value. To
illustrate, suppose a situation where two firms (A and B) could acquire each
other, but A is better equipped to make investments in the underlying assets of
both. Consider, if the boundaries of the firm are extended through integrating an
asset and related transactions -, the benefits and costs of asset acquisition accrue
to the party holding ownership, whereby ”...the benefit of integration is that the
acquiring firm’s incentive to make relationship-specific investments increases
since, given that is has ...residual control rights, it will receive a greater fraction of
the ex-post surplus” (Hart, 1995: 33). If B would acquire A, the incentives of A
would decrease while the incentives of B would increase. The reverse holds
would A acquire B. The allocation of property rights would thus be optimal if the
party would make investments who is best equipped to do so.
The edifice of the incomplete contract model is harmfully undermined if physical
assets are absent or unimportant - as is the case in many knowledge-intensive
firms. Since human assets in the absence of slavery cannot be bought or sold,
management and workers own their human capital and the residual control
thereof. (Hart, 1995). Furthermore, if human assets were the only assets which
could only be rented, the knowledge-intensive firm in Hart’s world is not
identifiable. Hart and Moore (1990) seems to recognize this weakness when they
explain:
It should be emphasized that the approach taken in this
paper...distinguishes between ownership in the sense of possession of
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residual control rights over assets and ownership in the sense of
entitlement to an asset's profit stream. In practice, these rights will often
go together, but they do not have to.”
(Hart and Moore, 1990: 1121, n. 3)
To the extent that human assets in knowledge-intensive firms are concerned,
residual income rights and residual control rights do not go together. This may,
but need not, undermine the value of the incomplete contract model for
knowledge intensive firms. These firms may posses for example databases,
trademarks, brandnames from the use of which knowledge workers could be
excluded. These assets are not physical, but nevertheless tangible and could thus
establish the basis for fiat by the threat of exclusion. One can thus ask if the
presence of these assets may rescue the application of Hart et. al.’s model to
knowledge-intensive firms.
The answer far from being straightforward, however, depends on how one
judges the knowledge workers’ dependence on these assets. If dependence is a
function of alienability of knowledge measured by the costs of knowledge
transfer than the distinction between specific and general knowledge (Jensen
and Meckling, 1995; Hayek, 1933) becomes important. The cheaper the transfer
of knowledge, the more likely is the knowledge transferred general knowledge.
The more expensive the transfer (if possible), the more likely we deal with
specific knowledge. If the reduction or avoidance of information costs, i.e.
caused through transferring knowledge while conducting transaction are of any
importance for the incomplete contract approach, it should favor the transfer of
general rather than specific knowledge. To the extent that databases, trademarks
and the like can be easier transferred than the individual’s expertise, much
speaks for a situation where the firm depends more on the knowledge worker
than the knowledge worker depends on the assets of the firm. We may thus add
to Harts insight, that not only ownership matters but the ease with which
knowledge is transferred matters too for the allocation of residual control rights
of physical assets (Brynjolfsson, 1994).
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Another way to rescue the incomplete contract model of the firm is to argue that
one of the key assets in knowledge-intensive firms is reputation. This is exactly
what Kreps (1990) suggests when he sees the firm as a repository of reputation.
However, one can ask with Hart (in Williamson and Winter, 1993: 153) “what it
means for reputation to be embodied in an organization as opposed to
individuals.” Additionally, the question has to be addressed why individuals
cannot build reputational capital through market contracting and how the
reputational capital is being sustained. In the absence of a satisfactory answer,
one can equally hold that reputation is indeed rented from customers and the
firms knowledge workers. To use Harts (1993) own words:
“In conclusion, while Krep’s view is an interesting one, it leaves some
questions unanswerd. In particular, the issue of what it means for
reputation to be embodied in an organization as opposed to an individual-
and the extent to which an organization can be said to be characterized by
its reputation-has still to be resolved”. (Ibid.:153)
Summary
To summarize the previous arguments, the rationale for the existence of the
knowledge-intensive firm is unlikely to be found in the contractual theories of
the firm. It has been shown that some pillars (specialization on fiat and
monitoring, employment contracts, private ordering) of the contractual theories
of the firm are indeed week on footing when applied to knowledge intensive
firms. I have proposed so far that neither the specialization on fiat nor monitoring
can be invoked as arguments for the superiority of firm coordination as opposed
to market coordination as far as the organization of knowledge-work is
concerned.
In the absence of a sound power-basis (e.g. employment contract, private
ordering,  asset ownership) fiat is unlikely to achieve coordination any better
than a market solution could. Equally, monitoring seems ineffective due to lack
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of local knowledge which prevents process monitoring by an external monitor.
Alternatively, group pressure and peer control seems possible, but both do not
require the appointment of an external monitor as residual claimant. Further, it
has been argued that output monitoring might be better understood as market
process. In sum, it is not obvious how asymmetric information (as a cause of
contractual imperfection) can be reduced through monitoring or fiat in
knowledge-intensive firms as opposed to monitoring between independent
contractors. Finally, it has been shown that a knowledge-intensive firm without
physical assets are simply not identifiable in the incomplete contract framework.
Thus, as far as the existence of the knowledge-intensive firm is concerned, we are
led to conclude for all contractual theories what Milgrom and Roberts (1988)
have concluded for transaction cost theory.
"The incentive based [contractual theories have] been made to carry too
much of the weight of explanation on the theory of organization. We
expect competing and complementary theories to emerge." (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1988:450)
All these arguments are not meant to suggest that the reasoning of the contractual
theories and especially the need to align incentives between contracting parties
are entirely irrelevant for the organization of knowledge-intensive business. In
the contrary, if human capital services are the main inputs to production, and if
this input is especially hard to measure and monitor, problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection are most likely. Furthermore, the arguments made here are
broadly consistent with Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) finding that intellectual
team production will be more likely be organized in partnerships including
market organized team activity and non-employer status. Furthermore,
organizing knowledge-intensive business might be less firm-like, and may
require less concentration of residual rights of control and income. However,
agreeing with the problem analysis of specific contractual theories of the firm is
one thing. Stating puzzlement in their application to the question of the existence
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of knowledge-intensive firms is quite another. These puzzlements are so severe
that for knowledge-intensive firms neither a sufficient nor necessary rationale for
their existence can be identified within the framework of the contractual theories
of the firm.
Conclusion and Opening Up
This paper has analyzed the existence of knowledge-intensive firms from the
perspective of the contractual theories of the firm. The broader question clearly is
how competitive advantage can be achieved through the organization of the key
assets (e.g. knowledge, human assets, intellectual capital) in knowledge intensive
firms. I have treated the question of the existence of the firm as a question of the
comparative advantages of firm organizations relative to market organization.
The analysis has shown that the contractual theories of the firm have next to
nothing to say about the existence of knowledge-intensive firms. Thus, we are
confronted with the following set of research options:
1. Turn to and further develop other theories that see the firm as a repository of
routines (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982); cognitive entity (e.g. Dosi and
Marengo, 1994); a response to structural uncertainty (e.g. Loasby, 1976,  1994);
resource and competence boundle (e.g. Conner and Prahalad, 1996), and
knowledge creating entity (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Simplifying, this
literature can be summarized as the knowledge/capability approach of the
firm, whereby greater stress is put on learning, time, dynamics etc. The
problem, however, is that these theories are at best imperfect alternatives
(Foss, 1997) to an impossible solution (contractual theories of the firm), when
we seek to address the question of the firms existence.
 
2. Another option may be to assume that knowledge-intensive firms are like
markets, whereby more firm like-coordination is signified by relational
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specialization, continuity of association, and the reliance on direction (e.g.
Demsetz, 1988), whether or not this relational structure is supported by a
contractual framework, whether or not this relational coordination-structure
relies on the allocation of specified property rights.
 
3. Consistent with the findings of the contractual theories of the firm we may
also assume that key assets in knowledge-intensive firms are organized in a
market like manner and consequently analyze competitive advantage and
performance differences of knowledge-intensive firms with market concepts
(e.g. entrepreneurship, intermediation, high powered incentives etc.).
 
4. Try to draw on contractual and capability approaches (e.g. Langlois, 1992;
Teece, 1982, Foss, 1997) to establish a sound rationale for the existence of the
knowledge-intensive firm.
Each line of inquiry seems promising and would deal with the questions of how
and when comparative advantages can be gained through the coordination and
organization of the key assets in knowledge-intensive firms. There are intersting
times to come for both, traditional economic theories of the firm and recent
developments in the field of strategic management.
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Appendix:
Theory Specialization Property
Right
Cost / Contract Focus
(1) Transaction Costs Theory
Coase (1937)
Williamson (1975, 1985)
Hierarchical
coordination:
Fiat / Direction
Fructus
Successionis
IC* (ex ante)
IC* (ex post)
 Incomplete
contract
Existence
Boundaries
(2) Teamproduction
Alchian & Demsetz (1972) Hierarchical
coordination:
Monitoring
Fructus
Abusus
Successionis
IC* (ex post)
Productivity loss
Complete contract
Existence
Internal
organisation
(3) Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) Hierarchical
coordination:
Monitoring
Incentives
Fructus
Successionis
IC* (ex ante)
Risk costs
Complete
contracts
Internal
organisation
(4) Incomplete Contracts
Hart (1989, 1993; 1995),
Grossmann & Hart (1986);
Hart & Moore, (1990)
* Information Costs
Hierarchical
coordination:
Fiat
Incentives
Usus
Fructus
Abusus
Successionis
IC* (ex post)
incomplete
contract
boundaries
Table 1: Contractual theories of the firm
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